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South Africa’s transition from apartheid to democracy stands as one of the past century’s most important
political events.  The transition has been successful to this point because the new constitution adopted
a form of federal governance that has been able to provide protection for the economic elite from maximal
redistributive taxation.  Appropriately structured, federal governance creates a “hostage game” in which
the majority central government controls the tax rate but elite run province(s) control the provision
of important redistributive services to a significant fraction of lower income households.   At least
to today, the political economy of South Africa has found a stable equilibrium with less than maximal
redistributive taxation.  Moreover, the move to a democratic federalist system has improved the economic
welfare of both the white minority and the black majority.   Whether the federal structure can continue
to check maximal taxation depends crucially upon the rate of time preference of the majority and their
demands for redistributive public services.  A new, impatient and more radical majority (ANC) party
threatens the current equilibrium.
Robert P. Inman
Department of Finance
Wharton School
University of Pennsylvania
Philadelphia, PA  19104-6367
and NBER
inman@wharton.upenn.edu
Daniel L. Rubinfeld
Robert L. Bridges Professor of Law and
Professor of Economics Emeritus
788 Simon Tower, Boalt Hall
University of California, Berkeley
Berkeley, CA 94720
and NBER
drubinfeld@law.berkeley.edu
1  Real incomes per capita have grown by 2% peer annum for all percentiles of the income distribution from
1993 to 2007.  (RSA, President’s Office, Development Indicators, 2008, p. 23).  The national rate of poverty has
declined from 31 percent to 23 percent over this same period (p. 26).    Rates of adult disability and infant mortality
are both down (p. 38).  Housing quality has improved significantly (pp. 31-34).  Class sizes are smaller, school
enrollment is up, and the national rate of literacy has increased (p. 49).  The two adverse developments since the end
of apartheid are the significant increase in the incidence of HIV and a resulting fall in life expectancy (p. 42) and the
increase in the national crime rate (pp. 60-61).  Overall, crime rates have fallen since 2004, however, and today’s rate
of just over 5,000 crimes per 100,000 residents is comparable to the rates in most large U.S. cities.   
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UNDERSTANDING THE DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION IN SOUTH AFRICA
by 
Robert P. Inman and Daniel L. Rubinfeld
I.  Introduction
South Africa’s transition from apartheid to a truly multi-racial democracy stands as one of the
significant political events of the last century. The transition was peacefully negotiated, the democratic bargain
is still holding, and despite still high rates of unemployment, the average South African resident, both black
and white, is economically better off today than they were under the last years of apartheid.1  Though peaceful,
the constitutional negotiations were far from harmonious.  It took over four years from the date of Nelson
Mandela’s release from Robben Island  on February 11, 1990 until April, 1994 before even an outline of a
democratic constitution was accepted by the three relevant parties to the negotiations, the National Party (NP)
representing the once ruling whites,  the African National Congress (ANC) representing the majority of blacks
and Asian South Africans, and Inkatha Freedom Party (Inkatha) representing the rural blacks of the historic
Zulu nation. 
This initial agreement, known as the Interim Constitution, outlined the broad parameters of the new
democracy.  First, it detailed the rules for the election of a National Assembly from which would be chosen the
President of the new republic, rules crucial to assure the increasingly impatient black majority they would have
an equal voice in a truly democratic new South Africa.  Second, it created nine provincial governments each
2with a separately elected legislature and premier (or governor), governments whose boundaries were explicitly
negotiated to assure the white (NP) and black (Inkatha) political minorities control over public resources and
policies in at least one province each.  These initial negotiations established the new republic as a federal
democracy, but beyond that the Interim Constitution was strikingly silent.  It took another two years of full time
negotiations before a final constitution was presented to the National Assembly, on October 11, 1996, for its
unanimous approval.         
The final constitution established three important principles for the governance of the new federal
democracy.  First, it accepted the geographical boundaries of the nine provinces, and thus their anticipated
political control, as specified by the original Interim Constitution.  Second, provinces were given responsibility
for the provision of K-12 education, health services, and housing, and for the administration of transfers to the
poor and elderly.  Third, the national government was required to share national tax revenues with the
provinces to finance assigned provincial services.  
In prior work (Inman and Rubinfeld (forthcoming)) we explained how the South African Constitution
and its institutions of federalism can provide self-enforcing protections for the economic interests of the largely
white economic elite that had ruled during the apartheid era.  We showed how federal governance,
appropriately specified, creates a “hostage” game between a majority controlled central government and elite-
run provinces (e.g.,Western Cape) that provide important redistributive services to majority residents.  When
specified against the actual performance of the South African public economy, we observe that the fiscal
allocations from 1996 to the beginning of the current regime of Jacob Zuma were sustainable as a long-run
policy equilibrium with less than fully redistributive taxation.  
In this paper we begin, in Section II, with a brief overview of the transition to democracy and a
description of the South African political economy, in many ways a prototypical transition economy with a
poor majority ruled by a once dominant but now threatened economic elite.  We then seek to answer three
questions.  First, in Section III and building off our earlier analysis, we show how federal governance can be
2  Waldmeir (1997), p. 157 quotes Nelson Mandela in his initial address on reconciliation as saying:  “(T)he
ANC is very much concerned to address the question of the concerns of whites. . .  They insist on structural guarantees
to ensure that . . . majority rule does not result in the domination of whites by blacks.  We understand that fear.  The
whites are our fellow South Africans.  We want them to feel safe.” 
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structured to provide sufficient protection for the economic elite such that they will find the transition to a
peaceful majority rule democracy preferable to the current threatened (and therefore costly) autocratic regime.
When our model is calibrated to the South African economy at the time of the transition, the proposed federal
institutions do provide a stable, majority rule democracy with less than fully exploitative taxation of the elite.
Second, in Section IV, we estimate the long-run economic gains of the transition to the poor majority and the
once ruling elite based upon the actual performance of the South African public sector.  Compared to the
alternative of remaining in apartheid, we conclude both parties have enjoyed significant, at least in the
aggregate, economic benefits from the transition.  
Third, in a concluding Section V we use our analysis to explore the future of South Africa’s federal
bargain as protection for elite economic interests.  Going forward South Africa may provide a direct test of
Weingast’s (1997) theory of the democratic transition based upon self-enforcing constitutions.       
II.  Federalism and the Transition to Democracy
A.  Background: At the time of the initial constitutional negotiations, Robert Mugabe’s Zimbabwe
provided a strong reminder to the leadership of both the NP and the ANC of the risks of simple majority rule
in an economy marked by wide disparities in incomes and assets.  Even with fair elections, the temptation for
the poor majority, or their elected representatives, to expropriate assets of those with substantial wealth might
prove irresistible.  It was clear to both the ANC and the NP leadership that a peaceful transition would require
a credible commitment to protect elite incomes.2  To this end, the NP and the ANC compromised on an interim
constitution establishing a federal democracy with simple majority rule in a  National Assembly, a President
elected by the Assembly, and nine provincial governments with boundaries drawn to ensure NP control of at
3  Waldmeir (1997), Chapters 10-13 provides an valuable overview of the transition negotiations.  Differences
over the structure of the federal contract are summarized on pp. 193-197; 241-244.  For a summary of how the number
and boundaries of the new provinces were decided, see Muthien and Khosa (1998).  These boundaries negotiated for
the Interim Constitution were accepted directly as part of the final constitution (final Constitution, Chapter 6, Section
103). 
4  A third alternative of having separate provincial governments each with significant own taxing and
spending responsibilities  was proposed by the NP and the Inkatha Freedom Party, but quickly rejected by the ANC;
see Waldmeir (1997) pp. 241-244.  
5  The final constitution does allow provinces to have their own taxation administered as a surcharge on the
national income tax, but such powers must be first approved by legislation from the National Assembly (final
Constitution, Chapter 13, Section 228).  To date such provincial taxing powers have not been approved by the National
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least one, ideally two, provinces.3  Left unspecified was the hard matter of policy assignment between the
national and provincial tiers of government.  That difficult task was delegated by an Interim Constitution to
a panel of experts to be appointed by the new President and to be known as the Financial and Fiscal
Commission (FFC).  The Commission was equally balanced in its representation between the ANC and the NP,
and each member of the Commission was an expert in at least one area of government policy-making: finance,
administration, or accounting. 
The constitution could have been either a unitary centralized democracy with a single, majority-elected
central government setting all policies, or a federal decentralized democracy where policy responsibilities were
shared between the national government and constitutionally-created provinces.4  South Africa opted for the
federal system, with constitutionally specified provincial borders described by the share of majority residents
originally living within the elite-controlled provinces. 
The FFC accepted the provincial boundaries and their likely voting outcomes as proposed in the
Interim Constitution (final Constitution, Chapter 6, Section 103).  On the crucial matter of who should decide
taxation and redistribution policies, the FFC gave control over all important taxes, in particular income and
profits taxation and the VAT, to the central government (final Constitution, Chapter 13, Section 214), but then
assigned control for the provision of redistributive services of K-12 education, health care, and housing and
the payment of poor and elderly transfers to the provinces (final Constitution, Schedule 4).5  Finally,
Assembly. 
6 Unitary governance occurs when this share is zero.
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redistributive services were to be funded by a constitutionally required sharing with the provinces of national
tax revenues (final Constitution, Section 227).  These recommendations were unanimously approved within
the FFC and incorporated directly into the unanimously approved final constitution.  
The end result was to create an annual redistribution policy game in which a majority ANC controlled
central government and elite controlled province(s) each sets one redistributive policy instrument of importance
to the other, taxes controlled by the ANC and redistributive spending by the elite.  Under well defined
conditions – low-cost elite providers of redistributive services and a sufficiently restrained and patient majority
– this annual policy game when played repeatedly can check the redistributive incentives of the national poor
majority.
B.  Conditions for a Peaceful Transition:  We model the political economy of South Africa as
involving an initial event in which the form of government is chosen, followed by an annual policy game in
which specific public service and taxation decisions are made.   Provincial borders are specified by the share
() of majority residents residing within an elite controlled province(s); federalism occurs when  > 0.6
Provincial service assignments are characterized in part by a parameter , which reflects the relative value that
a typical majority resident places on the redistributive services q assigned by the constitution to be provided
by the provinces.  Assigned services such as education, health care, or public housing might be important to
a majority resident, in which case  has a high value, or they can be relatively unimportant (e.g., street lighting,
parks and recreation), in which case  has a low value.  
Given annual public-sector policy decisions, the value of any democratic constitution will be the
discounted present value of all future utilities that follow from the choice of the constitutional parameters 
and , specified for poor majority residents (M) as: 
7  These specifications of lifetime utilities depend only upon elite and majority economic prospects under the
alternative political regimes.  We do not give explicit considerations here to the additional important values of
expanded  rights for the majority – the “rights” dividend – nor the potential gain for the elite of not having to police
a repressive regime – the “peace” dividend.  Both are important and are considered explicitly in Section IV when we
implement the model to evaluate the transition to democracy in South Africa. 
6
                                                                 VM(, ) = tt(, ),                                      (1)
and: 
                                                                 VE(, ) = tyt(, ),                                     (2)
for elite residents (E), where  is the economic utility of the typical majority adult resident, y is the economic
utility of the typical member of the white elite, and  is the discount factor bounded as 0 <   1.7  The value
of  depends upon an individual’s rate of time preferences and may differ for the majority’s and the elite.  For
the transition to be politically viable, it is necessary that a federal or centralized unitary democracy be preferred
to the autocratic alternative in which the apartheid system is maintained.  
A federal constitution specifying provincial borders () and service assignments () will be sufficient
for the peaceful transition to democracy if both the majority and the elite prefer the federal democracy to
autocracy, and then, among the democratic constitutions federal governance is preferred to unitary governance.
The federal constitution becomes necessary and sufficient for the transition when both parties prefer a federal
democracy, but the elite prefers autocracy to a unitary democracy.  
Whether a peaceful democratic transition occurs depends crucially on exactly how constitutional rules
determine annual policy outcomes.  In our previous work (forthcoming), we evaluated these policy outcomes.
In this paper, we estimate VM() and VE() and evaluate South Africa’s federal constitution’s ability to
facilitate the democratic transition.
C.  South Africa’s Political Economy:  In the annual redistribution game the central government
chooses an aggregate redistributive tax per elite resident (), with the proceeds of this tax allocated to the nine
provincial governments as a redistributive grant per lower income resident (g).  The central government also
7sets national standards for provincial spending on redistributive service inputs (q), which are provided at a cost
per resident s(q).  Redistributive inputs might include teachers, nurses, doctors, and social workers, but perhaps
also public housing, water facilities, lighting for streets, or paved roads.  The redistributive grants will be
sufficient to fund the required levels of these redistributive inputs, but to also leave a residual basic
redistributive grants (r), defined as: r = g - s(q).  The basic grants are “free” resources allocated by the
provinces to other services or to transfers to lower income households at the discretion of  provincial leadership.
We first describe the budgetary constraints and cost considerations that limit the available alternatives.  This
allows us to determine the annual utility that each group will achieve in pursuing its strategic alternatives.
The Government Budget Constraint:  The redistributive tax rate per elite resident  defines the
revenues available for transfers to the provinces for redistributive spending: g = g().  As the redistributive tax
rate increases, the taxpaying minority is free to leave the country or to adopt tax avoidance strategies.  Popular
stories aside, emigration from South Africa has not proven to be significant quantitatively.  Tax avoidance is
the primary means by which the elite reduces its tax payments.  
There is a revenue hill for redistributive taxation.  Revenues initially increase as  rises, reach a
maximum at U, and then decline.  Majority dominated unitary governments always select the maximum rate,
 = U.  Given the revenue potential of national redistributive taxation, a key issue is whether democratic
federalism will allow an equilibrium redistributive tax rate, denoted F, that is less than U. 
Service input standards for constitutionally assigned redistributive services may be set in response to:
(i) a constitutional requirement to provide a “fair” or “adequate” service level to all citizens successfully
enforced by a constitutional court, or (ii) presidential preferences enforced by agenda powers, or (iii) majority
citizen preferences enforced by majority-rule, median voter politics.  After satisfying the required service
standard, provinces are free to allocate the remainder of their redistributive grant to services of their own
choosing.  All fiscal policies are decided subject to an aggregate redistributive budget constraint which requires
that spending on redistributive services and unconstrained transfers be financed by centrally raised and
8  Having wages fully independent of employee productivity is not essential to our arguments and analysis,
but an imperfect matching of wages to productivity is important.  As a consequence of the decision to not discriminate
by race, South Africa has a common wage structure for positions in the civil service, without careful regard for
background or training. 
9  We assume that public services are provided by a common linear technology proportional to the training-
adjusted level of public employees: q = a(X/M), where (X/M) is public employees (X) per majority resident (M) and
a is employee productivity measured by years of training.   As an example, if there is one employee for every 25
majority adult residents and that employee has 14 years of training, then q = 14(1/25) = .56.  The cost of provision is
s(q) = S(X/M), so that se(q) = S(q/ae) <  sm(q) = S(q/am) <  su(q) = S(q/au) as ae > am > au.
8
administered redistributive taxation: g() = s(q) + r. 
The Cost of Providing Redistributive Services:  The primary service inputs used by the provinces to
provide redistributive services in South Africa are teachers (for education), doctors and nurses (for health care),
and social workers and public administrators (for income transfers).  We specify three classes of public
employees: minority elite providers with ae years of training, trained majority providers with am years of
training, and untrained majority providers with au years of training, where ae > am > au.  Better trained public
employees are more productive.  All public employees are assumed to be paid a common civil service wage,
S, which is only imperfectly related to their individual productivity.8  Therefore, more productive workers will
be less expensive when providing any required service input bundle.  The cost per majority resident of
providing public services is specified as s(q), with se(q) < sm(q) < su(q), using highly trained minority, majority
trained, and majority untrained providers, respectively.9  It is this “inherited” productive advantage of elite
public employees working in the elite province that will prove crucial to the elite’s ability to check redistributive
taxation.  The majority needs the elite and therefore has an incentive to retain their participation in the provision
of redistributive public services.
We assume that if the unitary regime is chosen, a fraction of the well-trained elite teachers, nurses,
doctors and civil servants will reduce their effort, or more likely, exit the public sector for comparable
employment in the private economy.  If so, then the elite’s cost advantage provided by the elite province
protects the attractiveness to the majority of the federal form of governance; it is only within federal governance
10  The lower bound for capture (L) is amount of capture than can occur before the majority notices that
redistributive funding is less than their expectations.  The upper bound for capture (H) is defined by amount of capture
9
that elite has an ability to hurt the majority if they adopt too high a redistributive tax rate.
Redistributive Fiscal Effort:  We assume that the central government can successfully monitor the
inputs allocated by the provinces to redistributive services.  As a result, once the standard for public service
provision has been set by the central government, the provinces comply.  But once this standard is met,  the
central government can no longer monitor the allocation of redistributive revenues.  If so, then the “free” or
unconstrained basic grant revenues  can be “captured” by the elite in the elite province for services consumed
by the elite residents.   For example, basic grant revenues meant for lower income services might be allocated
to shared facilities – center city roads, school science labs, or provincial data systems – or simply expropriated
for elite neighborhood facilities.  The share of basic grants so captured (0    1) measures a lack of
redistributive effort by the province.  In the public finance literature,  is often called the “flypaper effect” of
targeted grants.  Here we call  provincial “capture.”  The majority prefers that  = 0.  In majority run
provinces, capture for elite services will be zero.  However, in elite-controlled provinces there is shirking as
the elite seeks to push  as high as possible.  
We assume there is a lower value of fiscal effort L that the elite province can allocate to its elite
residents without detection or penalty by the majority, but there is an upper limit H as well.  The upper limit
defines maximum shirking and is set by the threat of majority residents in the elite province to leave the
province and relocate to a majority- run province where there is no shirking.  Given a cost of exit, the upper
limit is set to equalize the welfare of a typical poor resident in the elite province with shirking to that in a
majority run province without shirking.  If the majority does leave, then the elite province will receive no
redistributive transfers from the central government, have no redistributive responsibilities, but then no ability
to influence the central government setting the national redistributive tax rate.  Thus the elite will not exceed
this upper limit.10    
possible before the majority exits the elite province for neighboring majority provinces.  The more attractive is the elite
province for economic opportunities, the higher will be H..
11  On the potential for a protest penalty over the lack of redistributive services, see New York Times,
September 7, 2009, p. A-4, “Renewing a Tradition of Protest, South Africa’s Poor Demand Basic Services.”  That these
protests might become violent, see “Violence Mars Start of ANC Hearing,” Financial Times, August 31, 2011.  In the
application of our model to South Africa, we specify the bounds for L    H using the work of  Reinikka and
Svensson (2004); see Appendix. 
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Finally, choosing a level of capture above the lower bound, L is not costless for the elite.  When the
rate of capture exceeds its lower bound and services to lower income residents are noticeably reduced, poor
residents within the elite province impose a “protest” penalty of  Rand on each elite resident.  In equilibrium,
the costs of such protests discourage redistributive “shirking” via high capture.11 
Resident Economic Welfare: We evaluate welfare first under a federalist system and then under unitary
governance.  The economic welfare of elite residents will equal their pre-tax income, Y, minus redistributive
tax payments () plus any resources “captured back” through reduced fiscal effort (r) in the elite provinces:
y(, L) = Y -  + Lre(; q), 
                                                                            (3F)
y(, H) = Y -  + Hre(; q) - , 
under federalism with low capture and with high capture less a protest penalty, respectively.
Under unitary governance, 
                                                          y(U) = Y - U,                                (3U)
The economic welfare of a typical majority resident will be the sum of private sector income, W, the
utility value of redistributive services, denoted (q), and any “free”  redistributive revenues not captured by
the provincial government, (1 - )r.  For a majority resident living in an elite province with capture:  
e(, ) = W  + (q) + (1 -  )re(; q) , 
while for the majority resident living in a majority province: 
m(, ) = W  + (q) + rm(; q). 
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Since the provision of redistributive public services in the elite province is more efficient, re(; q) >
rm(; q).  In  equilibrium, this advantage must be sufficient to just compensate poor residents of the elite
province for elite capture.  In a federal equilibrium, a fraction () of the majority residents will live in elite run
province(s) and (1 - ) of the residents will live in majority run provinces.  We assume the majority leadership
wishes the maximize the welfare of the average majority resident defined as:  
                                                        (, ) = e(, ) + (1 - )m(, ),            (4F)
under federalism, and:
     (U) = W + (q) + r(U; q).                               (4U)
under and unitary governance.  
For both the poor majority and rich minority in the new democracy, welfare depends upon the
governance regime and, for the federal regime, the choice of the redistributive tax rate by the majority
controlled central government and the choice of capture by the minority controlled province.  Under  majority
rule unitary governance, the elite cannot prevent the choice of U.  Under democratic federalism they can, if
their constitutional control of redistributive spending allows for a successful punishment of maximal
redistributive taxation.  The punishment strategy is for the elite province to adopt H whenever the central
government selects U. 
D. Feasible and Sustainable Democratic Federalism: When the elite’s threat to adopt high capture
is credible threat, then democratic federalism becomes a feasible constitution.  Democratic federalism becomes
a sustainable constitution when both the majority and the elite prefer provincial to unitary provision of
redistributive services and a redistributive tax rate less than the maximal tax rate as a long-run equilibrium to
the annual policy game. 
Feasible Democratic Federalism:  For democratic federalism to be feasible, the elite needs high
capture to be a credible elite punishment in those instances when the majority leadership selects maximal
redistributive taxation, U.  For this to be true, two constraints on the design of the federal constitution must
11    Schelling (1960, pp.135-136) first proposed the use of “hostages” as a means for enforcing incomplete
contracts; see also Williamson (1983).  
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be met.  First, the majority must care enough about the elite provinces’ provision of redistributive services that
it will not strategically by-pass provincial government, and thus remove the elite’s ability to use its high capture
threat.  We call this constraint the Assignment Constraint.  The Assignment Constraint ensures that the
majority cares enough about assigned provincial services –   high enough – and the elite is sufficiently
effective in the provision of those services  –  se(q) sufficiently lower than sm(q) and  su(q) – that the majority
will not “de-fund” provincial governments and choose to provide all services through a de facto unitary
government.  This sets a lower bound to the importance and the quantity of assigned services.   There is an
upper bound as well.  If the level of required assigned service inputs is set too high, then the amount of
unconstrained basic grants available for capture is reduced and the economic penalty imposed by elite high
capture is marginalized.  Together, the Assignment Constraint is specified as a value of q bounded as qmin <
q  qmax such that if q falls outside the bounds, elite punishment is no longer credible   If the Assignment
Constraint does not hold, then when the elite province adopts high capture, the majority controlled central
government simply moves to de facto unitary governance, supplies redistributive services centrally, and denies
the elite any access to high capture of free redistributive transfers.  
The Border Constraint sets a lower and upper bound on the number of majority residents who live in
the elite province ().  If too few majority residents are in the province, then the elite’s threat to adopt high
capture is ineffective as the “pain” of high capture impacts only a few majority residents and can be
compensated for by adopting the maximal tax rate.  But if there are too many majority residents in the elite
province then the majority can out vote the elite in setting  provincial policies and again high capture ceases
to be a credible elite punishment.  The Border Constraint is specified as min <   max.  
When both the Assignment and Border Constraints are met, high capture becomes a credible elite
punishment and the annual fiscal policy game becomes a “hostage” game.11  The majority controls the central
12See, for example, Gibbons (1992), pp. 88-99.
13  See Gibbons (1992), pp. 100-102. 
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government’s tax rate and holds the elite’s income hostage, while the elite controls redistributive services to
an important share of the majority and holds the welfare of the average poor majority resident “hostage.”   
Sustainable Democratic Federalism: A central feature of this annual hostage game is the temptation
for the majority to defect from the cooperative federal allocation and adopt maximal redistributive taxation.
To discourage defection, the cooperating elite province must be able to impose a sufficiently large penalty on
a majority central government.  One possible penalty is for the elite province to adopt the “grim trigger
strategy” and play low capture as long as the majority central government has adopted a less than fully
exploitative tax rate, but if the central government selects U, then the elite province (credibly) adopts high
capture forever.12  For this game, the grim trigger strategy is the toughest penalty the elite can impose on the
majority.  If this penalty cannot discourage maximal taxation, then for this game, nothing will.13  In Inman and
Rubinfeld (forthcoming), we provide the conditions under which this repeated hostage game results in a less
than fully redistributive fiscal equilibrium, and under these conditions democratic federalism is sustainable as
a long-run policy equilibrium.  Our central Proposition states: 
Sustainable Democratic Federalism.  If the underlying political economy satisfies the
requirements of the Border and Assignment Constraints, there exists a grim trigger policy
equilibrium for sufficiently patient majority and elite residents in which democratic federalism
(F < U and  = L) is sustainable as a long-run constitutional equilibrium.
As in all policy games of this form, a crucial parameter for a sustainable long-run equilibrium is the
discount factor  for each player.   The Proposition specifies constraints on  required for the cooperative
choices in democratic federalism to be an equilibrium to this policy game.  Patient players have low rates of
time preference, values of  very close to 1, and a willingness to forgo the short-run gains of defection for the
long-run benefits of cooperation.  Impatient players have high rates of time preference, low values of , and
a propensity to prefer defection.   For democratic federalism to be sustainable, it must be true that the level of
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redistribution chosen each year under federalism is less than maximal redistribution – that is, F < U, or
equivalently, that g(F) < g(U).  
Unfortunately there is no guarantee that the rates of time preference of the actual participants in our
federalism policy game will meet the constraints.  Indeed, as the parties become more impatient the minimal
transfers the majority will accept exceed the maximal transfers the elite will allow:  gmin(m) >  g
max(e).
Impatient players want more now and if they are not compensated sufficiently over the long-run they will defect
to their “grabbing” strategies – here U and H.   For democratic federalism to be sustainable, both the rich
minority and the poor majority must be relatively patient players of government’s annual redistribution game.
If sufficiently patient, then  gmax(e)  gmin(m) and democratic federalism is sustainable.  
E.  Summary:  South Africa turned to federal governance as a solution to one of transition politics’
central challenges:  How can the new poor majority credibly promise not to exploit the now vulnerable rich
minority?  We have outlined the conditions where a federal constitution can provide such protections.  From
the Assignment Constraint, the elite must be a low cost provider of redistributive services important to the
majority and those services must be assigned to provincial governments.  From the Border Constraint, the elite
must politically control at least one important province and, given the central government’s level of assigned
services, have an incentive to punish the majority by capturing intended redistributive transfers when the central
government’s redistributive tax rate gets too high.  Finally, both the rich minority and the poor majority must
be sufficiently patient that the long-run economic benefits of the cooperative, federal outcome are preferred.
Under these conditions, democratic federalism does offer the promise of elite protection.  Whether this promise
has been realized in South Africa is our next question.  
III.  Is South Africa a Federal Democracy?
A. Redistributive Fiscal Policies (and Politics) in Democratic South Africa:  Table 1 details the time
path of redistributive fiscal policies in democratic South Africa, beginning with the first  budget under the full
control of the new ANC government led by President Mandela.  Mandela’s administrations then set the budgets
14  See footnote 9.  We specify the redistributive service input bundle by q = a(X/M), where X/M is public
employees (X) per adult majority resident (M) and where a is the measure of employee productivity equal to ae = 17
years of education for the average elite public employees, am = 14 years of education for the average “trained” majority
employee, and au = 7 years of education for the average “untrained” majority employee.  For example, in FY 1995/96
in the elite province,  qe = 17(1/32) = .56 while in the average majority province qm = 14(1/32) = .44.  The number
of employees per majority resident (X/M = 1/32) was set by Financial and Fiscal Commission as a national standard,
but the quality of the employees – measured by years of schooling – was much higher in the elite province  – that is,
ae > am.  Over time this difference in employee quality has been offset by an increase in the number of employees hired
in the majority provinces so that the levels of q between the elite and majority provinces have been equalized. 
15
through FY 1999/2000, followed by the budgets set by his chosen successor, President Thabo Mbeki.  Mbeki
was first elected in May, 1999, and then re-elected in May, 2005.  Beginning in late 2006, however, the rank
and file within the ANC began pushing for substantially more redistributive spending, particularly for
education, health care, and public housing.  Rank and file resistance culminated in Mbeki’s ouster as the leader
of the ANC at the party’s December, 2007 convention, replaced by Jacob Zuma.  Mbeki resigned the
presidency in May, 2008, replaced by an interim President, Kgalema Motlanthe.  The budget for FY 2008/2009
was a negotiated budget between Mbeki and the Zuma-led “new” ANC.  Zuma was elected to a full term as
President in May, 2009.  The budget for FY 2009/2010 reflects the preferences of the Zuma presidency.  Three
important conclusions are evident from the results in Table 1.   
First, redistributive spending and the level of redistributive services provided to lower income
households has been significantly higher under democracy than under apartheid, initially a 400% increase and
growing.  In the first democratic budget specified after the election of President Mandela and the new
parliament ( FY 1995/96) the average level of redistributive spending for education, health care, housing, and
lower income transfers was 2189 Rand/capita (Table 1, Col. 1;  $350/person).  The level of redistributive
service inputs provided to the poor majority is measured here by public employee training years per majority
adult.  This first post-apartheid budget provided for redistributive service inputs of  qe = .56 for lower income
residents of the Western Cape (Table 1, Col. 4) and qm = .44 for the majority residents in the average majority
run province.14  In contrast, for an average year during post-Soweto apartheid regime (1977-1993), spending
for comparable redistributive services is estimated  to be about 525 Rand/capita, supporting a level of
15  This estimate of redistributive spending is for education, health care, and income transfers to lower income
families.  Excluded from this estimate are payments to the leaders of the homelands, particularly to Chief Buthelezi
of the kwaZulu homeland.  We have estimated homeland payments to average about 1,500 Rand/capita over the years
1977-1993, the post-Soweto years. Source: Development Bank of South Africa, Annual Report, Various Years.  See
also fn. 32  where we provide an estimate of q = .16 for the last ten years of the apartheid regime.  
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redistributive inputs per majority adult of only q = .17.15            
Second, the path of redistributive spending mirrors closely the wider politics of South Africa.
President Mandela’s redistributive budgets adhered closely to those recommended by the Financial and fiscal
Commission.  The Commission had been established by the Interim Constitution to specify the constitutional
groundrules for fiscal policy, particularly for the financing and provision of redistributive services by the
provinces.  As part of his effort to gain the confidence of the original white elite, Mandela’s appointments to
the Commission gave equal (50:50)  representation to members of the ANC and NP.  The FFC and its
responsibilities were confirmed by the final Constitution.  Mandela’s budgets followed closely the
recommendations of this bi-partisan Commission.  The aggregate level of redistributive spending remained
constant during his presidency (Table 1, Col. 1).   What did change was the allocation of the total redistributive
budget away from the elite Western Cape towards the majority provinces (Table 1, Cols. 2, 6), and in
particular, for funds given to the provinces for spending on redistributive service inputs (Table 1, Cols. 3, 7).
This reallocation has allowed the majority provinces to hire more teachers, nurses, doctors, and social workers
as an offset to the higher quality of those employees in the Western Cape.  The result has been an equalization
of effective (training adjusted) public employees per majority resident by the end of Mandela’s term (Table 1,
Cols. 4, 8), an allocation that holds to this day.       
Mandela’s chosen successor, Thabo Mbeki, followed the Mandela budgets almost exactly for the first
five years of his presidency.   Beginning in FY 2005/2006, however, growing pressure from the rank and file
within the ANC pushed Mbeki to increase resources for redistributive spending, from aggregate allocations of
2231 Rand/capita in FY 2004/2005 to 2735 Rand/capita in 2007/2008.  The majority of the funds were
16  The initial level of the basic grant given to the Western Cape was very large in the first post-apartheid
budgets of FY1995/96 to FY1997/98.  The reason was a large supplemental grant to the high quality medical complex
in the Western Cape to ease the transition away from full to only partial government support.  See Financial and Fiscal
Commission, The Allocation of Financial Resources Between the National and Provincial Governments,
Recommendations for Fiscal Year, 1996/97. September 9, 1995.  
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targeted at redistributive service inputs. The average level of q within the majority provinces rose from .57 (.60
in the Western Cape) to .72, an increase of 26 percent over those three intervening budgets.  Even this increase,
it appears, was not enough to placate demands for more redistribution.  Mbeki was replaced as head of the
ANC at their December, 2007 convention and resigned the presidency in September, 2008.   Jacob Zuma
became the new head of the ANC, Motlanthe the interim president after Mbeki’s resignation, and Zuma the
newly elected president in May, 2009.  In the two years since Mbeki’s ouster, redistributive budgets and
services have increased another 18 percent.  The last budget (FY 2009/2010) for which full data are available
allocates an average of 3213 Rand/capita to redistributive spending and requires a level of redistributive
services per majority adult of q = .85.           
Third, despite the significant increase in the level of required spending for redistributive service inputs,
the aggregate level of grants has been sufficient to leave significant funds as“free” or unconstrained provincial
revenues; see Table 1, Cols. 5 and 9.16  In more recent years, the basic unconstrained grant has averaged about
500 Rand/capita in the elite province, equal to about $435 million dollars a year for discretionary provincial
spending.  While these funds are ostensibly meant for poverty spending for majority residents, they can be
“captured” for elite services in the elite province.  The treatment of elite capture of these basic grants is what
potentially deters the majority from adopting maximal taxation.  Basic grants are fiscally significant.  Whether
they are large enough that their capture deters maximal taxation, and thus preserves democratic federalism as
an equilibrium transition outcome, is our next question.  
B.  Is Elite Punishment Credible and Democratic Federalism Feasible?  Under South Africa’s
democratic constitution, majority voting will determine both cental government and provincial fiscal policies.
17  See final Constitution, Section 4. Strictly speaking, the assignment is “concurrent” meaning that the central
government retains the right to provide these services directly if it wishes.  Our analysis of the equilibrium fiscal
allocations explicitly allows for the possibility of a central government “take-over” of redistributive service provision,
a regime we call de facto central governance.  What deters the majority central government from adopting this strategy
in equilibrium is the efficiency advantages of using the elite run province to provide services to an important fraction
of poor, majority residents.  
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During constitutional negotiations, the majority ANC insisted that the level of redistributive taxation be set by
the central government.  In return, the elite NP demanded that provinces be assigned the central role for
providing redistributive public services.  If assigned redistributive services are “important enough” to the
welfare of the majority ( large enough) and if at least one demographically important province is controlled
by the elite ( large enough), then the elite will have a credible punishment and an ability to influence the
redistributive fiscal choices of the central government (and in particular the tax rate ).  Since the first election
in 1994, the elite controlled province has been the Western Cape.  Redistributive public services assigned to
the provinces include K-12 education, health care including public health, housing, and the payment of income
transfers to qualified households.17  Establishing that these Western Cape borders and constitutional service
assignments are sufficient to meet our Border and Assignment Constraints is the first step towards confirming
the long-run viability of democratic federalism in the South Africa.  
The shaded area in Figure 1 (Feasible Democratic Federalism) shows those combinations of elite
provincial borders, measured as the equilibrium share of the majority () living within the province, and the
centrally mandated level of assigned redistributive services (q), that satisfy the Border and Assignment
Constraints at the time of the democratic transition.  The Border Constraints set an upper and lower bound on
the share of poor majority residents who live in elite controlled provinces.  The upper bound ensures that the
elite population will still be a political majority in their province, even if the elite leave the country with
maximal redistributive taxation.  The lower bound, shown by the curve min(q), ensures that when the majority
does choose U, the elite has an incentive to adopt the maximal H punishment.  This requires y(U, H) > y(U,
L), as specified by Equation (3F).  For this to be true, there must be enough majority residents residing in the
18  The maximum size of the province depends upon our specification of N(U).  The simplest specification
for elite tax avoidance is N() = N0 - 	, where N0 is the initial minority elite population of 9.6 million and 	 (> 0)
measures the degree of tax avoidance as  rises.   We calibrate 	 = .00015 to imply a plausible peak to the national
revenue hill from elite resident taxation based on the estimates by Gruber and Saez (2002).  Setting 	 = .00015 sets
the revenue maximizing tax rate per elite resident for redistributive services at 32,000 Rand/elite resident, or
approximately 37 percent of average middle income residents’ incomes ( = 37,000R/86,000R) paying taxes.  This
specification implies N(U) = 4.8 million elite residents.  The total number of adult (voting age) majority residents at
the time of the transition was 25 million; see Appendix.  Thus max = 4.8M/25M = .192.   
The specification for min(q) requires that Hre(U, q) > , or that H[g(U) - se(q)][M/N(U)] > .  The
Appendix to the paper provides the calibration for the South African economy needed specify min(q) from this
constraint.  The only parameters not drawn directly from the South African economy are estimates of H and .
Estimates of high capture come from the work of Reinikka and Svensson (2004) on bureaucratic capture of school
funding in Uganda.  Estimates of  are from the work of Collins and Margo (2007) for the costs of urban riots on U.S.
city economies.
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elite province so that rewards from the high capture of unconstrained transfers, Hre(U, q), compensate for
the expected protest penalty () imposed by the majority on each elite resident.   Since re(U, q) = g(U) - s(q),
unconstrained transfers per majority resident decline as mandated q increases.  To ensure captured  revenues
can overcome , the number of majority residents in the elite province must be increased.  Provincial borders
may need to be redrawn.  The Border Constraint requires max  > min(q).  Figure 1 shows our estimate of
max = .192 and the location of min(q) for the South African political economy.18   
The Assignment Constraint requires the majority to prefer federal over de facto unitary governance
even if the elite adopts the high capture strategy – that is,  (U, H) > (U) from Equations (4F) and (4U).
The benefit to the majority of federalism is the ability to use low cost, elite provinces for the provision of
redistributive services.  The cost to the majority of federalism is the risk of capture.  The Assignment
Constraint is designed to ensure the majority prefers federalism.  As the number of majority residents in the
elite province () increases, capture by the elite is more and more damaging to the majority.  Thus as  rises,
unitary governance becomes more attractive.  To restore a preference for federalism, the cost advantage of
having provinces must be increased.  This is done by making required redistributive services more and more
19  Strictly speaking the constraint is defined not by q itself, but by the underlying preferences of the majority
for q, specified here by the function 
(q).   For our calibration of the South African economy, we specify majority
preferences for redistributive services by ln(q), with the requirement that  3960.  See Inman and Rubinfeld
(forthcoming) and a full Data Appendix, both available upon request.  
20  As for the specification of qmin(), the precise specification of qmax is in terms of majority preferences for
redistributive services, here given as ln(q), with the requirement that 6100  .  See Inman and Rubinfeld
(forthcoming) and our full Data Appendix for details. 
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important to the majority.   In Figure 1, this is shown by the curve qmin(), where q > qmin().19   
The level of centrally required redistributive services cannot be too large, however.  The upper bound,
qmax(), is the value of q at which the benefits of high capture to the elite just fail to compensate for the penalty
 of using high capture.  Then, the elite province cannot credibly threaten to choose H and democratic
federalism can no longer be sustained as an equilibrium outcome.  This occurs along the curve, min(q), where
for any value of  there is a corresponding value of qmax.  The Assignment Constraint requires that the majority
chosen level of assigned services fall within the bounds, qmax()  q > qmin(). 20  
Together, the Border and Assignment Constraints define the set of federal constitutions within which
democratic federalism is a feasible long-run equilibrium of the annual policy game setting the redistributive
tax rate, redistributive services, and provincial capture.  The set of feasible constitutions for our specification
of the South African political economy at the time of transition (see the Appendix) is shown as the shaded area
in Figure 1.  We need to know whether the actual South African constitution falls within this set.
At the time of initial (Interim) constitution, the NP had hoped to win political control of two provinces,
the rural Northern Cape and urban Western Cape.  Provincial borders were explicitly set with this outcome
in mind; see Muthien and Khosa (1998).   The NP, however, misjudged voter turnout by alienated conservative
white farmers and farm workers in the Northern Cape.  As a consequence the ANC won control of the province
in the first elections of 1994 and has continued its majority position ever since.  In contrast, the NP and now
the middle-class, centrist Democratic Alliance (DA) and its political allies have held majority control over the
21  The ANC has never won more than 45 percent of the vote in the Western Cape.  Coalitions of the various
elite opposition parties have won at least 51 percent of the vote; see www.elections.org.za.  In the election of  2009,
the Democratic Alliance won 48 percent of the Western Cape and the “break-away” moderate party from the ANC
called the Congress of the People won 9 percent.  The ANC won only 32 percent of the Western Cape vote. 
22  We define the actual value of   = (Me/M), where Me is the majority adult population in the elite run
province and M is the total majority adult population.  The actual voting outcomes over the past 14 years favors the
non-ANC (elite) coalition by a small majority.  Therefore N(F)/[Me + N(F)]  .51 must hold for the actual adult
populations of the Western Cape, where N(F) is the elite adult population in the Western Cape.  The average elite
adult population over this period in the Western Cape was N(F) was a bit larger than 4.8 Million.  If so, then to meet
the narrow majority voting outcomes observed in the actual voting data, Me = 4.6 Million must hold: 4.8M/[4.6M +
4.8M] = .51.  Finally, the total  majority adult population in South Africa at the time of the transition was M = 25
million.  Thus we specify  = (Me/M) = 4.6M/25M = .184.  
23  The average cost of providing q in the two sets of provinces are specified in the Appendix.  
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Western Cape from those first elections.21  Today the Western Cape is the elite controlled province with  =
.184 of the majority adult (voting age) population residing in the province; see Figure 1.22
Given the choice of the Western Cape as the elite controlled province, and the fact that for this province
 = .184, feasible values of mandated redistributive services are bounded as qmax() = .86  q > .58 = qmin().
Table 1 shows the redistributive spending chosen by each of the political regimes.23  For the first three years
of the Mandela presidency, redistributive services provided in the Western Cape (qe  .56 to .49) were greater
than those provided in the majority provinces (qm  .44 to .43), reflecting a negotiated commitment to the white
bureaucracy and its concentration in the urban Western Cape as part of the original transition agreement.
These disparities were removed by a significant re-allocation of redistributive spending away from the Western
Cape to the majority provinces in the last two years of the Mandela presidency; see Table 1.  The average level
of q provided in all the provinces rose from .46 in FY1995/96 to .54 by the last Mandela budget.  The average
level of q chosen by Mandela was just outside the lower bound of what is needed for feasible democratic
federalism.  While the majority might have been tempted to defect to unitary governance, Mandela’s absolute
control over ANC politics and his commitment to the federal compact was sufficient to block that option and
24   During the Mandela presidency, the level of redistributive services was recommended by a constitutionally
created independent commission (Chapter 13, 220-222) known as Financial and Fiscal Commission (FFC), forwarded
to the legislature without change by President Mandela, and then approved without amendment by the ANC controlled
legislature.  For example, the 1998 budget proposals by the Finance Department to the legislature commented that “it’s
(FFC’s) recommendations for the division of resources between the three spheres of government (that) form the basis
of the current allocations” (1998 Budget Review, Department of Finance, as quoted in Financial and Fiscal
Commission: A Ten Year Review).  The FFC  membership was appointed by Mandela and was equally divided between
ANC and National Party representatives.  Commission decisions were typically made by unanimous agreements
between the representatives of the two parties.  The FFC’s recommended level of redistributive services was 1 teacher
per 38 school-aged children, 3.5 preventive health care clinic visits a year for each majority adult and child, and 4500
(real 2000) Rand for each income eligible child, elderly, and disabled majority resident for social insurance transfers.
Together, these targets required redistributive grants sufficient to pay for .038 public employees per majority resident
or, for an average level of training of 14 years per employee, q = .53 public employee training-years  per majority
resident.   See FFC, The Allocation of Financial Resources Between the National and Provincial Governments, FY
1996/97, September 8, 1995. 
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sustain federal governance.24                    
Matters became much less certain under the leadership of Mandela’s successor, Thabo Mbeki.
Mbeki’s early budgets set the levels of redistributive services very near the Mandela recommendations (q 
.57 to .60) and just within the feasible set for democratic federalism  –  until FY 2005/06.  Both in terms of
aggregate redistributive spending (gF) and the chosen levels of q, these early budgets clearly favored the elite.
Just enough redistribution was being provided to hold the majority’s potential demand for unitary governance
in check.  Beginning in 2006, ANC politics shifted, and with it, the redistributive budget.   Led by the
leadership of the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) and the ANC Youth League, the ANC
rank file began to push for significantly more redistributive services.  Mbeki responded by increasing the
funded level of q significantly in his last three budgets, by 30 percent from q = .61 to q = .79 in the majority
provinces.  Aggregate redistributive spending (gF) increased proportionally.  But this was not enough to prevent
Mbeki’s defeat as head of the ANC in December, 2007 and his subsequent resignation as President in
September, 2008.  
The upward trend for redistributive services has continued since Mbeki’s resignation and the rise to
power of Jacob Zuma as the leader of the ANC.  Our most recent estimate for FY 2009/2010 places q = .85
and very close to the maximum value consistent with feasible democratic federalism.  If mandated redistributive
25  And note that for any value of q,  gmin(m) is larger the more impatient becomes the majority as measured
by the lower value of m.  
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services gets much larger, the elite will not be able to credibly threaten the use of high capture as its punishment
for a majority’s decision to set  = U.  If so, then democratic federalism with F < U and  = L will no longer
be feasible as an equilibrium to the annual policy game.  By our estimates, South Africa’s redistributive politics
is close to this tipping point. 
C.  Is Democratic Federalism Sustainable? For democratic federalism to be sustainable the elite
minority must be able to credibly check the poor majority’s preferred option of maximum redistribution.  This
is possible if the Assignment and Border Constraints are met and if the majority values future welfare enough
that the losses from the elite’s use of a high capture punishment forever (the “grim trigger” strategy) is greater
than the one time gains that come from adopting  maximal taxation when the elite cooperates with low capture.
When this is so, there is a range of redistributive transfers such that g(U) >  g
max(F; e)  g(F)  gmin(F; m).
A sufficiently patient majority gives the threat of high capture the clout it needs to check  redistributive
taxation.  
Table 2 provides the estimates of gmax(F; e) for the elite and g
min(F; m) for the majority for our
specification of the South African political economy.  We provide two estimates of the minimally acceptable
grant for the majority, first, using a discount factor consistent with the real rate of interest for the South African
economy since the fall apartheid (r = .08, m = .93) and second, using a discount factor consistent with
estimates by Karlan and Zinman (2008) for the rate of time preference for credit constrained, lower income
South African households (r = 2.00; m = .33).   The maximally acceptable grant for the elite assumes a
discount factor consistent with the real rate of interest (r = .08, e = .93).  For these discount factors, the
requirement for sustainable democratic federalism has held for all presidential regimes to date; see Table 2,
Cols. (2) and (3).25   
Four conclusions emerge from the analysis in Table 2.  First as modeled here, democratic federalism
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is sustainable for majority redistributive preferences and discount factors, even a very low discount factor, as
revealed by the presidencies of Mandela, Mbeki, and Zuma.  Second, the bargaining range for sustainable
redistribution measured as [gmax(e) - g
min(m)] has been shrinking and actual levels of both g
max(e) and g
min(m)
have been rising over time.  As the majority has chosen higher levels of required redistributive services over
time, the amount of unconstrained redistributive transfers available to the elite province for high capture
declines.  This reduces the penalty that can be imposed by elite high capture and shifts the balance of
bargaining power towards the majority.  The net effect is to raise both gmax(e) and g
min(m).  As g
max(e) has
an upper limit of g(U), the bargaining range gets squeezed as well.  
Third, it is particularly evident from a comparison of our estimate of gmin(m) to the actual transfers
paid by the Mandela and “early” Mbeki administrations, that an “anti-majoritarian” decision had been made
to moderate the redistributive payments of the central government, perhaps as a signal to the elite that they need
not fear majority rule.  Actual transfers paid were only  75 percent of the majority’s “required” minimal
transfers.  But fourth, these early anti-majoritarian budgets have now yielded to growing majority pressure
within the ANC for higher transfers.  The last Mbeki and first Zuma budgets are only a few Rand below the
gmin(m) requirement, and they meet the constraint in the majority provinces in FY 2010; see Table 1, Col. (6).
Whether the federal compromise for sustainable federalism will continue under the new leadership of Jacob
Zuma is the open question.  We will evaluate this question in Section V.  
But first we ask: Was democratic federalism as specified here economically beneficial ex ante to both
the majority and the elite, and thus sufficient to facilitate a peaceful transition to democracy?   
IV.  Federalism and the Economic Value of the Democratic Transition
For there to be a peaceful transition from autocracy to democracy, the once ruling elite and the new
democratic majority must prefer democracy to autocracy and agree on the preferred form of the democratic
constitution.  Our focus is on the economic value of these constitutions as measured by the discounted present
value of future economic welfare for the majority and the elite under autocratic and democratic governance:
26  Our estimate of the preference parameter, , follows from the specification of majority demand for
redistributive services under the assumption the majority selects its preferred level of services setting marginal benefits
equal to marginal costs.  For the last Zuma budget for FY 2009/10, the preferred level of services is q* = .85; see Table
1.   The marginal cost of each unit of q is 4,850 Rand/Majority Resident; see Appendix.  Marginal benefits are specified
here as 
(q) = /q.  Equating marginal benefits to marginal costs for q* = .85 implies a value of  = 4123:  
(q)
= /.85 = 4,850	  = 4123. 
27  The results will show that the majority unambiguously benefits from income growth and elite transfers in
every year of the democracy, so the majority’s preference for democracy is unaffected by the discount rate.  Using a
majority discount factor of  = .33 (as implied by the work of Karlan and Zinman, 2008) rather than  = .93 will
reduce the size of aggregate benefits, but leaves unaffected the majority’s preference for democracy. 
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VM(, ) and VE(, ) respectively.  We compute the welfare gain for the majority and for the elite of moving
from autocracy to democracy for both a unitary democracy ( = 0) and for a federal democracy ( > 0).
Under unitary governance this equals VM(U)  = VM( = 0; ) - VM(A; ) for majority residents and VE(U)
= VE( = 0; ) - VE(A; ) for elite residents.  Under federal governance,  VM(F) = VM( > 0; ) - VM(A;
) and VE(F) = VE( > 0; ) - VE(A; ) apply.  A peaceful transition is possible when VM(U) > 0 and
VE(U) > 0 or VM(F) > 0 and VE(F) > 0 hold.     
To estimate VM(, ) and VM(A; ) for majority residents and VE(, ) and VE(A; ) for elite
residents for each of three political regimes we must first specify the future paths of majority and elite incomes,
and then specify the level of elite taxation and the level of redistributive services.  For majority residents we
will assume a common specification in all political regimes for utility from redistributive services:  (q) =
4123ln(q).26  When computing the present value of the future stream of annual welfare to the date of the
transition (1994) we also assume a common 70 year  horizon for citizen welfare (to 2064) and a common
discount factor of  = .93.27 
We project the future paths of majority and elite incomes conditional upon their incomes in the first
year (1994) of the transition, when W0 equals 9,700 Rand per adult majority resident and Y0 equals 86,000
Rand per adult elite resident.  Incomes for both the elite and majority residents are then allowed to grow
according to an estimated common annual growth rate, predicted under the  continuation of apartheid and under
the new democracy.  We assume the predicted rates of growth rates are identical for unitary and federal
28  On the effects of fiscal decentralization for economic growth, see Davoodi and Zou (1998) and Rodriguez
and Ezcurra (2011).  In both studies there is statistically significant but quantitatively very small negative effect of
expenditure decentralization – the relevant measure here – on country economic growth.  
29   For the history of trade sanctions against South Africa, see Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot (1990). 
30  The average rate of growth during the last years of apartheid is estimated as the estimated constant effect
of 2.042 less the offsets from SANCTIONS ( =1) and COSATUAPARTHEID (=1):  -.766 = 2.042 - .928 - 1.880. 
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democracies.28  Growth rates are computed based upon the performance of the South African economy over
the same period, 1950-2008; see Table 3.  A simple regression comparing the average annual rate of real
income growth pre- and post-democracy is shown in Table 3, Col. (1).  The variable DEMOCRACY equals
1 for all years after the transition (1994 onward).  The average rate of income growth under apartheid (1950-
1993) is 1.24 percent per annum, while that under democracy (DEMOCRACY = 1) is 2.65 percent per annum.
The sample average apartheid growth rate of 1.243 percent does not accurately reflect growth in the
last years of the repressive regime, however.  These years were marked by the presence of international
sanctions on trade and by the extension of rights to organize and to strike to black, majority-controlled unions
called the Congress of South African Trade Unions or COSATU.  Under the assumption that sanctions and
majority controlled unions would continue if apartheid were to continue, then the effects of these institutions
on growth will need to be considered.   We do so by adding indicator variables to our core regression for trade
sanctions (SANCTIONS = 1 for 1976-1993, 0 otherwise) and for government’s recognition of majority
controlled unions during apartheid (COSATUAPARTHEID = 1 for 1985-1993, 0 otherwise) and then
democracy (COSATUDEMOCRACY = 1 for 1994 onward, 0 otherwise); see Table 3, Col. (2).29  During
the apartheid years, sanctions had a negative but imprecisely estimated  effect on growth, reducing the annual
rate by 9/10's of a percent.  Majority unions and their threat of industrial action had a larger and statistically
significantly negative effect, reducing the annual rate of growth by about 1.88 percent.  Together SANCTIONS
and COSATU reduced the expected annual rate of growth in the last eight year’s of the apartheid regime to
a negative 8/10's of a percent.30  Once democracy occurred, these negative effects disappeared.  Sanctions did
31  The average rate of growth during the first years of democracy is estimated as the estimated constant effect
of 2.042 plus the overall effect of DEMOCRACY (=1) less the small negative effect of COSATUDEMOCRACY (=1):
2.649 = 2.042 + .823 - .216. 
32 During the last 10 years of apartheid, homeland budgets averaged 26.3 Billion (2000) Rand per year or
about 1052 Rand for each of the 25 million majority adult residents; Development Bank of South Africa, Annual
Report, Various Years.   We assume these services were provided by trained and untrained majority providers at a cost
of 6714 Rand per unit of q; see Appendix.  Thus q = .16 = 1052R/6714R.  This is probably a generous estimate, given
that a significant share of homeland payments were thought to go to the personal use of the homelands’ tribal leaders.
33  See fn. 26. 
27
not apply after 1994, and the estimated effect COSATU on growth under democracy is no longer significantly
different from zero.  The resulting average rate of growth over the past fourteen years of democracy has been
a positive 2.65 percent per annum.31   In projecting future incomes we will assume an average annual rate of
growth of  -.8% if apartheid were to continue  and 2.65% under the new democracy.
  In addition to future incomes, the poor majority benefits from the provision of redistributive public
goods and income transfers paid for by taxes on the elite residents.  This is true under both apartheid and
democracy.  Under apartheid, we assume the majority would continue to receive the real value of redistributive
services provided by apartheid government’s transfer to homeland governments under the last ten years of
apartheid rule.  These transfers averaged 1,052 Rand/majority adult resident and imply a level of redistributive
service inputs per majority resident of qA = .16.
32    Under apartheid, there are no additional income transfers.
Under a federal democracy, the elite is taxed at the equilibrium tax rate of F to pay for both
redistributive services and a lump-sum income transfer.  We assume the actual budgets from FY 1995/96 to
FY 2009/10 reported in Table 1 represent the results of the actual policy game conditional on the shifting
politics within the ANC.   We also assume the equilibrium revealed in the 2010 budget where qF = .85 holds
for all future years.  This is the preferred level of redistributive services under democratic federalism for
majority preferences specified by  = 4123.33  Transfer revenues not allocated to redistributive services become
available as lump-sum income transfers to the majority.  Assuming the FY 2009/2010 budget represents the
long-run equilibrium budget for democratic federalism, 1,254 Rand per majority adult resident will be available
34  Total transfer revenues is 3,213 Rand per capita; see Table 1.  Also from Table 1, the average level of
spending for redistributive services, averaged over the elite and majority provinces, is 2,536 Rand per capita.  This
leaves 677 Rand per capita available for pure income transfers. The ratio of majority adult citizens to total population
at the time of the transition was 25 Million/46 Million = .54.  Thus the funds available for income transfers per
majority adult resident will be 1,254 (= 677/.54). 
35  The maximal redistribu8tive tax rate on each elite resident is specified by peak of the redistributive revenue
hill: Revenue = N(), where N() = N0 - 	.  For N0 = 9.6 Million elite residents before redistributive taxation and
	 = .00015, then Revenue is maximized where dRevenue/d = 0, or when U = 32,000 Rand per elite resident.  The
average elite resident had an income of 86.000 Rand at the start of the transition. See the Appendix.  Ignoring growth,
the implied maximal redistributive tax rate on income would be 37 percent (= 32,000/86,000).  
36  Costs of q under unitary governance will a weighted average of the costs using majority trained and
untrained public employees, sm(q) and su(q) respectively; see Appendix.  Under unitary governance, we assume the
share of majority employees who are trained is .825; see Full Data Appendix available upon request.  Thus costs of q
will equal 6713 Rand per majority resident.  From  
(q) = 4123/q = 6713, we compute qU = 62. 
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as a lump-sum income transfer.34   Not all of these funds will be available, however.  Under democratic
federalism, the elite province can capture back some if these revenues.  The equilibrium rate of capture is L
= .15 in this province.
Under unitary democracy, the majority taxes the elite at the maximal tax rate and allocates all the
proceeds to the majority’s preferred level of redistributive services and then, after providing services, allocates
the remainder to the majority as a lump-sum income transfer.  The maximal redistributive tax rate is 32,000
Rand per elite resident which provides a maximal redistributive budget of 6,145 Rand per adult majority
resident.35   For majority preferences specified by  = 4123, we compute the preferred level of q under unitary
governance as qU = .62; less redistributive services are demanded in unitary governance because the government
can no longer utilize the efficiency advantage of a low cost elite province.36  Providing qU = .62 costs 4,123
Rand per majority resident under unitary governance.  This then leaves  2,022 Rand per majority resident as
a pure income transfer.  Since there are no provinces, there is no elite capture of this transfer.  
Elite welfare in these three regimes depends upon annual elite incomes – and thus growth rates – and
elite taxation.  We estimate the elite tax rate for the apartheid regime as the annual cost per elite resident of
homeland payments made for redistributive services.  The average annual budget for homeland payments for
37  During the last 10 years of apartheid, homeland budgets averaged 26.3 Billion (2000) Rand per year or
about 1052 Rand for each of the 25 million majority adult residents; Development Bank of South Africa, Annual
Report, Various Years.   At the time of the transition, there were 9.6 Million upper income residents.  Thus the annual
cost of these transfers was 2,740 Rand per elite resident.  
38  From Table 1, total transfers per capita are 3,213 Rand in FY 2009/10, the first year of a full equilibrium
for democratic federalism.  This total per capita is equivalent to 5,950 Rand per majority adult resident.  The ratio of
majority adult residents to elite adult residents in equilibrium is 25Million to 5Million, implying a total transfer burden
on the elite of 29,750 Rand per elite resident.  However, elite residents can capture back a share of transfer payments
paid to the elite province and not allocated for redistributive services, an amount equal to gF in the Western Cape minus
se(q) in the Western Cape: 2710 - 2168 = 542 Rand per capita; see Table 1, Col. 5.   This is equivalent to 1,004 Rand
per majority adult residents in the Western Cape.  The elite can capture back L = .15 of those unconstrained transfers
or 150 Rand per majority adult.  Finally, elite adults are a political majority in the Western Cape, but only slightly.
Thus we assume 150 Rand per elite resident is available as capture.  The net of capture taxes paid by the elite will be
29,750 - 150 = 29,600 Rand in equilibrium.  
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the decade before the transition was $26.3 Billion (2000) Rand, or 2,740 Rand per elite resident.37   Under
democracy, taxation of the elite population must be sufficient to support the larger equilibrium  level of
redistributive services as well as the lump-sum transfer paid to majority residents.  Under democratic
federalism, the elite can capture back L = .15 of that transfer in their elite province.  Equilibrium elite taxation
net of capture will equal 29,600 Rand per elite resident annually under democratic federalism.38  Finally, under
unitary governance elite taxation will be the maximal redistributive tax:  U = 32,000 Rand per elite resident.
A comparison of the two tax rates shows that democratic federalism lowers elite redistributive taxation by
2,400 Rand per year from the maximal rate, or by about 7.5 percent.  Compared to apartheid, redistributive
elite taxation is more than 10 fold larger under either democratic regime.  For the elite, the question becomes:
Does improved economic growth compensate for these higher taxes?    
Table 4 compares economic welfare under apartheid and unitary governance and under apartheid and
federal governance for both the majority and the elite.  By a strict economic accounting, both the majority and
the elite benefit in the long-run from the transition and therefore both will prefer democracy.  The majority
gains unambiguously.  Democracy provides a growth dividend and redistributive transfers are also higher.  The
economic gains occurs immediately at transition; there are no years of negative returns and the internal rate
of return is infinite.  The aggregate present value of the transition’s economic benefits for a typical majority
39 Source:  South African Department of Information, Perskor, South Africa, Various Years.
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resident is 154,329 Rand under unitary governance and 161,393 Rand under democratic federalism, the
difference representing the efficiency advantages of democratic federalism in the provision of redistributive
services.   
The present value of lifetime economic benefits are also positive for the elite, though the first four years
show a negative net benefit as the improvement in private incomes from the growth dividend is not yet sufficient
to overcome the increased tax costs of greater redistribution; see Table 4, Col. 1.  Beginning in  FY 2000/01,
elite after-tax incomes under democracy relative to the apartheid turn positive.  Interestingly, if the ANC
majority controlled (Zuma) budgets been adopted from the first year of democracy, it would have taken ten
years for the elite’s growth dividend to overtake increased redistributive taxation.  Mandela’s early, far more
modest redistributive budgets were perhaps a considered effort to share more quickly transition’s growth
benefits with the elite, and thereby win their commitment to the new democracy.  In any case, the elite benefits
are significant.  The discounted present value of net, after-tax income gains from the transition are 395,909
Rand under unitary democracy and 412,922 Rand under federal democracy; see Table 4, Col. 2.  The results
show a significant internal rate of return from the democratic transition, close to 30 percent; Table 4, Col. 3.
As an economic calculation alone, only the most impatient elite residents should have resisted democracy.  
Omitted from these calculations but certainly important to the motivations for the transition are the
unmeasured benefits of human rights and liberties for the majority and the benefits of peace and security for
the elite.  The “rights dividend” is a direct add-on to the economic returns for the majority and increases the
attractiveness of the transition.  The “peace dividend” for the elite is not so obvious.  While the annual
expenditures required to contain the guerrilla war ceased with the transition, spending for police services since
then have risen dramatically.  We estimate that from 1977 to 1993 the apartheid regime spent 33.7 Billion
(2000) Rand annually on military, police, and prison services.39  Since the end of apartheid, police and prison
40  Source:  South African Budget, Department of Finance, Various Years.  It would be useful to include a
comparison of the economic costs of crimes committed in the calculus as well, but reliable crime rates for the apartheid
era are not available.  Interestingly, a comparison of reported violent crime rates in democratic South Africa to those
of American cities, show South Africa to be safer than Baltimore, New Orleans, Newark, Miami, Oakland,
Philadelphia, Cleveland, St. Petersburg. Washington, DC, and Boston, all cities with violent crime rates greater than
South Africa’s current rate of 1200 violent crimes per 100,000 residents.   South African crime rates peaked in 2004
and have been declining for the past seven years. 
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expenditures alone have averaged 39.1 Billion (2000) Rand per year.40  Including these added expenditures as
a tax burden on the elite in the apartheid and democratic regime reduces the economic attractiveness of the
transition for the elite by about 20 percent; see Table 4, Col. 2.   In the end, however, all but the most short-
sighted elite still gain and prefer the transition; see Table 4, Col. 3. 
The results in Table 4 indicate that either unitary governance or federal governance would have been
sufficient, on economic grounds, to allow the transition to democracy.  Both V(U) and V(F)  are positive
for the majority, and so too for the elite.  Between the two forms of democratic governance, federalism is
preferred because of its use of the efficient elite province for the provision of redistributive services.  But the
estimated effect here is not large.  In the end, it appears the real value of federalism is its creation of an elite
run province capable of checking the majority’s temptation for maximal redistribution.  But for our calibration
of the South African political economy, even that benefit is no more than a 7 to 8 percent reduction from full
redistribution.  Perhaps the real value of democratic federalism, as shown by our analysis here, was to provide
the institutions that could make credible the majority’s transition promise not to adopt maximal taxation, or
in the words of President Mandela’s to offer  “a democratic government . . . that (has) an inbuilt mechanism
which makes it impossible for one group to suppress the other.” (Speech by President Mandela, Stellenbosch
University, May, 1991).               
V.  Summary and Conclusions
Any peaceful transition from autocracy to democracy must offer to the current ruling elite credible
safeguards for their lives and property sufficient to make the new democratic regime more attractive than
41  See “Violence Mars Start of ANC Hearing,” Financial Times, August 31, 2011.   
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continuing autocratic rule.  Previous research has suggested three alternative institutions for such protections:
1) continued elite control of the military (Acemoglu and Robinson , 2001); 2) veto control over policies through
an elite “upper” legislative chamber (Lijphart, 1984), or 3) a gradual extension of the franchise to the majority
to match the growth of a propertied middle class (Lizzeri and Persico, 2004).  Neither of these options is likely
to be agreed to by a suppressed majority today.  
South Africa’s transition to democracy has suggested a fourth option: democratic federalism.   Under
appropriate conditions, federal  institutions create a hostage game in fiscal policy in which the majority controls
taxation while the elite controls, through governance of at least one important province, the low-cost technology
for the provision of valued redistributive services and transfers to the majority.   When the Border and
Assignment Constraints are met, democratic federalism is said to be feasible.  Whether democratic federalism
is sustainable as a long-run equilibrium to the hostage game depends upon the discount rates of the majority
and the elite.  If both are sufficiently patient, then there exists a long-run equilibrium in which redistributive
taxation is below its maximal rate and redistributive services and transfers are provided, in the elite controlled
province(s), by the low-cost technology.  When feasible and sustainable, democratic federalism provides a
credible signal for the protection of elite property.   We then applied our analysis to the South African political
economy at the time of the transition and found for our specification that all conditions are currently being met
and the transition has proven to be welfare improving for both the majority and for all but the most impatient
elite. 
The future is less certain.  While the current ANC leadership under President Zuma has been
responsive to the demands from the ANC rank and file for increased redistributive services, rising by more
than forty percent since the last of the Mandela-Mbeki budgets, significant pressure for even greater
redistributive spending remains.41   Were the ANC leadership to significantly increase required redistributive
42  Including perhaps the nationalization of the mining industry and expropriation of white-owned land; see
“Nationalization in South Africa: A Debate That Will Persist,” The Economist, December 3, 2011.   An outcome
anticipated as early as 2007 by Saki Macazoma, a leading member of the older ANC leadership, in his comments on
original emergence of President Zuma:
Look at the prominent people around him.  If some of the things they say come to pass then we will
be facing a calamity such as “We need free education.”  How are you going to pay for it without
nationalizing the mines?  Financial Times, December, 17, 2007. 
43  See Charlene Hunter Gault, “Letter from South Africa,” New Yorker (July 5, 2010). 
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services there is the risk that our Assignment Constraint will be violated and elite high capture will no longer
be a credible threat to maximal taxation.  Zuma and his ANC successors have three possible responses.  First,
continue to control ANC policy by isolating the ANC factions pushing for increased redistributive spending
and elevate to importance representatives from the emerging black middle class.  Second, relax the Assignment
Constraint’s value of qmax() by lowering the protest penalty () through increased police presence (a central
government function) in the elite province, thereby raising the incentive for the elite to adopt high capture.  Or
third, give in to the demands for increased redistributive services, violate the Assignment Constraint, and
expose the current regime of democratic federalism to the possibility of maximal taxation and de facto unitary
governance.42  To date, President Zuma has adopted the first strategy.43  
Finally, and more generally, the future path for democratic fedealism in South Africa may well provide
a direct test of Weingast’s (1997) theory of the democratic transition and importance of self-enforcing
constitutions.  Weingast’s analysis stresses the importance of, first an unsustainable autocratic status quo
because of  civil war or outside threats, and second the necessity for a new democratic agreement to be self-
enforcing.  Our analysis of South Africa’s transition has highlighted the importance of both points.  Weingast’s
third requirement, that self-enforcing compacts require preferences immune to opportunism, is now being tested
by the pressure for increased redistribution by the more radical wing of the ANC.  Our specification of the
South African political economy and the central role of majority demands for redistributive services, q, makes
a concrete prediction as to the future of the original democratic agreement between the majority and the elite.
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 If the demand for redistributive services moves outside the set of feasible self-enforcing federal constitutions,
then our analysis predicts the original democratic compact may collapse with maximal taxation of elite
economic interests and the emergence of de facto unitary governance as final outcomes.  
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TABLE 1: REDISTRIBUTIVE FISCAL POLICIES:  Real (2000) Rand per Capita
FISCAL
YEAR
President gF
National
Average
(1)
gF
Western
Cape
(2)
se(q)
Western
Cape
(3)
qe
Western
Cape
(4)
re
Western
Cape
(5)
gF
Majority
Provinces
(6)
sm(q)
Majority
Provinces
(7)
qm
Majority
Provinces
(8)
rm
Majority
Provinces
(9)
1995/96 Mandela 2189 2923 1371 .56 1552 2119 1356 .44 763
1996/97 Mandela 2030  2587  1334 .52 1253 1978 1345 .44 633
 1997/98* Mandela  2000  2424  1250 .49 1174  1959  1332 .43  627
1998/99 Mandela 2154 2206 1398 .55 808 2149 1709 .55 440
1999/00 Mandela 2108 2097 1368 .54 729 2110 1674 .54 436
2000/01 Mbeki 2242 2185 1455 .57 730 2247 1778 .58 469
2001/02 Mbeki 2302 2196 1494 .59 702 2313 1826 .59 487
 2002/03** Mbeki 1903 1720 1342 .53 378 1923 1500 .49 423
2003/04 Mbeki 2151 1896 1479 .58 417 2180 1700 .55 480
2004/05 Mbeki 2231 1941 1514 .60 427 2264 1766 .57 498
2005/06 Mbeki 2327 2011 1609 .63 402 2363 1890 .61 473
2006/07 Mbeki 2559 2186 1750 .69 436 2603 2082 .68 521
2007/08 Mbeki 2735 2293 1835 .72 458 2787 2230 .72 557
2008/09 Mbeki† 3005 2522 2018 .79 504 3063 2450 .79 613
2009/10 Zuma 3213 2710 2168 .85 542 3273 2619 .85 654
SOURCES: FY: 1995/96 to 1997/98: Financial and Fiscal Commission, The Allocation of Financial Resources Between the National and Provincial Governments:
FY 1997/98, Tables 2, 3, 6b.  FY 1998/99 to 2009/10: Minister of Finance, Division of Revenue Bill, Various Years, Part 4: Provincial Allocations. 
NOTES TO TABLE 1
COLUMN DEFINITIONS:  For the purposes of this analysis, all allocations to KwaZula-Natal are included as part of the allocations to “Other Provinces.” Central
Government Revenues = Total revenues per capita raised by central government taxation; gF = Total intergovernmental transfers per capita paid to the province(s),
averaged over all provinces (National Average), for the Western Cape, and for all other provinces excluding the Western Cape (Ave. Other Provinces); s(q) =
Assigned service grants per capita to fund 5-17 education, primary health care services for (lower income) citizens qualifying for medical assistance, and social
security grants for the elderly, disabled, and children, for the Western Cape (se(q)) and the average for all other provinces (sm(q)); qe and qm are estimates of the
redistributive service bundle provided in the elite (Western Cape) province and all other majority-run provinces computed as qe = se(q)/Se = se(q)/2541R and qm
= sm(q)/Sm = sm(q)/3086R respectively (Se and Sm are computed from estimates in Table 3 adjusted to reflect costs per resident, not majority adult); and r = “free”
redistributive revenues per capita to fund all other provincial services and is defined as r = gF  - s(q) and includes funding for “basic government services,”
government administration, and provincial economic development initiatives. 
*Data for FY 1997/98 is based upon projected grants provided in the FFC, The Allocation of Financial Resources Between the National and Provincial
Governments: FY 1997/98, Table 6b.  
** Beginning with the FY 2002/03 Budget, the Department Finance adjusted the accounting procedures for funding of the provincial activity.  There is therefore
an unavoidable break in the data sequence.  All financial data from FY 2002/03 onward is recorded on a consistent basis.  
†
 The last Mbeki budget was negotiated with, and implemented by, the new ANC majority under the de facto leadership of Jacob Zuma, but with the presidency
held by an Interim President, Kgalema Motlanthe.  Motlanthe served until May, 2009.
TABLE 2: SUSTAINABLE REDISTRIBUTION IN SOUTH AFRICA:1996-2010
(Transfers per Capita; Real 2000 Rand)
 
PRESIDENTIAL
REGIME (e; m)
q
 (1)
gmax(F; e)
(2)
gmin(F;  m)
(3)
g(F)
(4)
ge(F)
(5)
gm(F)
(6)
Mandela, 1996
(.93; .93) .51 3299 3088 2189 2923 2119
Mandela, 1996
(.93; .33) .51 3299 3227 2189 2923 2119
Mandela, 2000
(.93; .93) .54 3301 3108 2108 2097 2110
Mandela, 2000
(.93; .33) .54 3301 3233 2108 2097 2110
Mbeki, 2002
(.93; .93) .59 3301 3108 2302 2196 2313
Mbeki,2002
(.93; .33) .59 3301 3233 2302 2196 2313
Mbeki,2009
(.93; .93) .74 3304 3155 3005 2522 3063
Mbeki,2009
(.93; .33) .74 3304 3251 3005 2522 3063
Zuma, 2010
(.93; .93) .81 3305 3175 3213 2710 3273
Zuma, 2010
(.93; .33) .81 3305 3258 3213 2710 3273
NOTES TO TABLE 2
Column 1: q = Public Employee Training Years per Majority Adult for redistributive public services, defined to include K-12 education, primary health
care services, and spending for children, disability, and elderly income transfers adjusted to “employees” after division by the average employee salary.
See Table 1, population weighted average of cols. (4) and (8). 
Col. 2: gmax(e) = Predicted maximum redistributive transfer per capita the upper income residents will pay for support of redistributive services (q)
and unconstrained provincial transfers (r) while remaining committed to democratic federalism and the cooperative strategy of low shirking, low
capture (L). 
Col. 3: gmin(m) = Predicted levels of the minimal redistributive transfer per capita the poor majority residents will accept for support of redistributive
services (q) and unconstrained provincial transfers (r) while remaining committed to democratic federalism and the cooperative strategy of  a less than
maximum redistributive tax rate, F < U. 
Col. 4: g(F) = Average  redistributive transfer per capita paid to all provinces. See Table 1, population weighted average of cols. (2) and (6). 
Col. 5: ge(F) = Average  redistributive transfer per capita paid to the elite province, Western Cape.  See Table 1, Col. (2). 
Col. 6: gm(F) = Average redistributive transfer per capita paid to all majority controlled provinces, including KwaZulu-Natal. See Table 1, Col. (6).
TABLE 3: SOUTH AFRICAN ECONOMIC GROWTH: 1950-2008†
INDEPENDENT
VARIABLES
GROWTH 
RATE
(1)
Mean = 1.56 
S.D. = 2.13 
GROWTH 
RATE
(2)
Mean = 1.56 
S.D. = 2.13
Constant 1.243
  (.308)*
2.042
   (.374)*
DEMOCRACY 1.405
  (.651)*
.823
  (1.480)  
COSATUAPARTHEID - -1.880
    (.835)*
COSATUDEMOCRACY - -.216
(1.435)
SANCTIONS - -.928
 (.713)
R2(Adj) .060 .235
† 
 Dependent variable is South Africa’s annual real rate of growth of GDP per capita.  Independent variables
include: DEM (= 1 for the years 1994-2008; 0 otherwise), COSATUAPARTHEID (= 1 for the years 1985-
1993; 0 otherwise) COSATUDEMOCRACY (= 1 for the years 1994-2008; 0 otherwise), and SANCTIONS
(= 1 for the years 1976-1993; 0 otherwise).  
Source: GROWTH  RATE, IS from the Penn World Tables, 7.0 and correspond to the PWT variable
GRGDPCH.  DEMOCRACY, COSATU, and SANCTIONS are defined in the text. 
* Significant at the 5% level; standard errors within parentheses.
TABLE 4: NET ECONOMIC GAINS FROM THE DEMOCRATIC TRANSITION†
YEARS UNTIL
Vt  0
(1)
V:
70 YEAR HORIZON
(2)
DEMOCRACY’S INTERNAL
RATE OF RETURN
(3)
MAJORITY
Unitary 0 VM(U) = 154,329 Rand 
Federal 0 VM(F) = 161,393 Rand 
ELITE
Unitary  4 Years VE(U) = 395,909 Rand .27
Federal Democracy 4 Years VE(F) = 412,922 Rand .28
ELITE:  PEACE “DIVIDEND”
Unitary  6 Years VE(U) = 333,602 Rand .18
Federal Democracy 6 Years VE(F) = 350,615 Rand .19
†COLUMN DEFINITIONS: Years until Vt  0 are the number of years until the net present value gains in after-tax incomes in moving from apartheid to each
form of democracy just exceeds zero.  V for a 70 year horizon is the net present value gains in after-tax income in moving from apartheid to each form of
democracy.  Democracy’s Internal Rate of Return is the discount rate where net present value of after-tax incomes under democracy are just equal to the net present
value of after-tax incomes under apartheid for the 70 year.  Since majority welfare is larger under the first year of democracy onward, the internal rate of return
is infinite.  
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APPENDIX
South Africa’s Political Economy at Transition
South Africa’s political economy at the time of the transition defines the environment in which the
decisions were made to specify the new federal constitution – in particularly, assignment () and border
constraints () – and then given these constitutional constraints, to choose redistributive fiscal policy: the tax
rate (), the mandated level of redistributive services (q), and rate of elite recapture ().  Both the constitutional
decision and the annual decisions on fiscal policy are made conditional upon the political economy’s underlying
demographic, income, technological, and budgetary constraints at the time of the transition.   Also specified
are our estimates of majority citizen preferences for redistributive goods, the discount factors and associated
rates of time preference for elite and majority residents, the bounds on the rates of elite capture, and the penalty
associated with high elite capture.  A full data appendix detailing all sources and methods used to estimate the
underlying model’s parameters is available upon request.  
Demographics: 
M  = Majority adult (voting age) population at the time of the transition = 25 Million. 
N0 = Initial elite adult (voting age) population at the time of the transition = 9.6 Million. 
Income: 
W0 = Average income per majority resident at time of transition = 9,700 (Real 2000) Rand.
Y0  = Average Income per elite resident at the time of the transition = 86,000 (Real 2000) Rand.
Technology of Public Service Provision:  
q = a(X/M) = Quality adjusted (a) public employees (X) per majority resident (M).
ae = Years of training of elite public employees = 17 years of schooling.     
am = Years of training of majority public employees = 14 years of schooling.  
au = Years of training of “untrained” public employees = 7 years of schooling  
Costs of Public Service Provision:
S = Uniform salary paid to all public employees = 80,000 (Real 2000) Rand/Employee.
s(q) = S(X/M) = S(q/a) = Cost per unit of q provided by workers of quality a. 
se(q)  = S(q/ae) = (80,000/17)q = 4,706q (Real 2000) Rand /Majority Adult.  
sm(q) = S(q/am) =  (80,000/14)q = 5,714q (Real 2000) Rand /Majority Adult.
su(q) = S(q/au) =  (80,000/14)q = 11,428q (Real 2000) Rand /Majority Adult.
Budget Constraint and Tax Revenues:  
g() = Redistributive Grant per Majority Resident =  [N() - Z]/M.
 = Redistributive Tax Rate per Elite Resident (N).
N() = Elite Residents Paying the Redistributive Tax = N0 - , where  = .00015.
Z = (Exogenous) payments to KwaZulu-Natal Province = 600 Million (Real 2000) Rand.
Citizen Preferences:
(q) = Majority Adult preferences for redistributive goods = ln(q), where 6100    3960.  
e = Discount factor for the elite residents = .93 (r = .08). 
m = Discount factor for the majority residents = .93 (r = .08)   m  .33 (r = 2.00). 
Elite Capture: 
L = Low elite rate of capture of free provincial revenues = .15. 
H = High elite rate of capture of free provincial revenues = .85.  
re(; q) = “Free” provincial revenues per majority resident for elite capture  = [ge() - se(q)].   
	 = Penalty per elite resident for adopting high capture = 1720 (Real 2000) Rand. 
